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REPLY TO DR. IRION'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" 
Dismissal of a complaint, as occurred in the district court here, is justified 
only when the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff 
does not have a claim. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.. 910 P.2d 1218, 
1220 (Utah 1996). In determining whether a trial court properly dismissed an 
action, a reviewing court assumes that the factual allegations in the complaint are 
true and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Id. at 1219. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, the assertions set 
forth in the Snows' amended complaint must be accorded verity. In his 
"Statement of the Case," Dr. Irion fails to recognize this principle. 
On pages 2 and 3 of his brief, Dr. Irion repeatedly refers to the malignant 
tumor on Mrs. Snow's ovary as a "cyst." The Snows' complaint identifies the 
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growth as a tumor. Even Dr. Irion's own answer identifies the tumor as a "mass." 
Dr. Irion's attempt to transform the tumor into a mere cyst is inappropriate. 
Dr. Irion asserts on page 2 of his brief that "Mrs. Snow's cancer has been 
successfully treated, and she has since been in remission, with no diagnosis of 
recurrent cancer." The affidavit of Mr. and Mrs. Snow which Dr. Irion cites 
actually states the facts as follows: 
Although we understand there has been no diagnosis of 
"recurrent" cancer since Marion's second surgery on 
August 13, 2002, we have never been told by any 
physician that Marion is in remission or cured from her 
cancer. 
(R. 57; see also Exhibit "A", attached to this reply brief). 
Dr. Irion states that the Snows' complaint alleges he failed to timely 
diagnose and treat Mrs. Snow's cancer and timely refer her to an oncologist, 
causing "a statistically greater risk for return of ovarian cancer." This summary of 
the Snows' complaint inaccurately implies that it contains no claims other than a 
damage claim based on increased risk of cancer recurrence. The Snows' 
amended complaint very clearly sets forth a number of additional claims. For 
example, the Snows allege Dr. Irion actually caused the spread of her cancer and 
her need for further surgery and subsequent chemotherapy by rupturing the 
tumor as he inappropriately attempted to remove it vaginally. (See TJ20 g of 
Amended Complaint, R.13). In addition, the Snows claim Dr. Irion directly injured 
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Mrs. Snow's bladder while attempting to perform his vaginal hysterectomy, which 
he could have avoided had he proceeded appropriately. (See 1J20 d of Amended 
Complaint, R. 12; see also Exhibit "B", attached). 
On page 3 of his brief, Dr. Irion asserts: "The Snows make no allegation of 
injury beyond their claim that there is a heightened risk that Mrs. Snow's cancer 
will return." That assertion is simply inaccurate. (See e.g., ffl{20 d ar>d 9- 21, 23, 
24, 27, 28 and 29 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, R. 9-15; see also June 30, 
2004 Joint Affidavit of Marion Snow and Roger Snow at R. 56-58). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RULE ON THIS APPEAL 
UNTIL THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DECIDED 
MEDVED V. GLENN (SC #20040492). 
Dr. Irion contends the decision of the district court should be upheld 
because the district court correctly interpreted and applied this Court's decision in 
Medved v. Glenn, 2004 WL1065503 (Utah App) and Seale v Gowans. 923 P.2d 
1361 (Utah 1996). After this Court issued its opinion in Medved v. Glenn, supra, 
the Utah Supreme Court granted Medved's petition for writ of certiorari. Medved 
v. Glenn currently pends before the Utah Supreme Court. That Court heard oral 
argument in the case on March 1, 2005. It is likely to issue an opinion in Medved 
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in the near future. The principle issue in Medved is identical to the principal issue 
raised in this appeal. The Supreme Court's decision in Medved is likely to be 
dispositive. It is also likely to clarify the holding of Seale v. Gowans. supra. This 
Court, therefore, should hold off ruling on this appeal until the Supreme Court has 
decided Medved. 
II. 
THE SNOWS HAVE ALREADY SUSTAINED ACTUAL 
INJURY AS A RESULT OF DR. IRION'S NEGLIGENCE. 
Dr. Irion asserts: "The Snows fail to allege an actionable injury" (Appellee 
brief at p. 10) and "The Snows' allegations of damages do not qualify as an 
allegation of present actual injury." (Id. at 9). Finally, he states: "It must be 
remembered, Dr. Irion did not give Mrs. Snow cancer." (Id. at 10). According 
verity to the Snows' allegations, as this Court must, all of these assertions are 
inaccurate. 
While it is true that Dr. Irion did not create the malignant tumor he found 
while undertaking to remove Mrs. Snow's uterus, he did cause the spread of 
cancer which necessitated her second surgery and subsequent treatment when 
he ruptured the tumor and allowed its malignant cells to seed throughout her 
body. In addition, he was responsible for the lengthy delay in the commencement 
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of treatment for the spread of the cancer. (See Amended Complaint at ffljl 0 - 1 5 
and 17-18, and 20 -29; R. 9-15). Also, he perforated Mrs. Snow's bladder during 
his surgery on her. (See Exhibit "B", attached and R. 12,1J20 d) 
In opposing Dr. Irion's motion to dismiss in the district court, Roger and 
Marion Snow signed an affidavit attached to their counsel's memorandum. As Dr. 
Irion concedes in footnote 2 of his appellee brief, that affidavit is appropriately a 
part of the record. It is found at R. 56-58. A copy is attached to this brief as 
Exhibit "A". For purposes of this appeal, this Court is bound to accept the 
following averments as true:1 
3. Because Marion was required to have two surgeries and 
chemotherapy treatment, she was required to use all of her 
family/home leave time from work and then lost her job and all 
related benefits, including health and life insurance coverage. She 
is no longer able to work. 
4. Marion applied for and was granted Social Security Disability 
benefits on November 7, 2003 because of health issues related to 
the spread of her ovarian tumor, requiring chemotherapy treatment 
and a second surgery. The benefits were deemed retroactive to 
December of 2002, shortly after Marion's second surgery. The 
monthly payments made by Social Security are substantially less 
than Marion's income when she was able to work. 
5. When Marion lost her job, we lost our group health 
insurance. We now have COBRA coverage, which is very 
costly, and which will expire in February 2005. At that point 
we will have no health insurance and Marion will still be too 
young for Medicare coverage. It is unlikely we will be able to 
1See. e.g., Whipple v. American Fork Iriqation Co.. 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 
1996). 
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obtain other health insurance due to her "pre-existing" 
condition. 
6. We have incurred medical bills in excess of $140,000.00 which we 
believe are directly attributable to Dr. Irion's substandard care. 
7. Marion is no longer able to perform many daily tasks she 
performed before Dr. Irion's surgery in June of 2002. We 
attribute her inability to perform many normal activities of 
daily living to Dr. Irion's substandard care. We believe that 
had Dr. Irion correctly diagnosed and removed Marion's 
ovarian tumor, there would have been no necessity for a 
second surgery to remove cancer resulting from seeding, 
and Marion would not have required the further treatment 
and surgery which have significantly reduced her ability to 
function. 
8. Since Dr. Irion's negligent removal of Marion's ovarian 
tumor, we have suffered a profound diminution of our quality 
of life together and cannot participate in many of the 
activities we used to enjoy before her injuries. 
(R. 57-58; see Exhibit "A", attached). 
Clearly, the Snows have alleged significant and very real actual, present 
damage resulting from Dr. Irion's negligence. The injuries and damages 
described above are all actionable. 
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III. 
SEALE V. GOWANS DOES NOT HOLD THAT 
A CLAIM FOR ENHANCED RISK OF CANCER 
RECURRENCE IS INACTIONABLE NOR DOES IT 
HOLD THAT A PERSON WITH A PRESENT HARM 
MAY NOT ALSO CLAIM A FUTURE HARM. 
Dr. Irion sets forth on pages 6 and 7 of his brief the facts in Seale v. 
Gowans. That recitation reveals a key fact distinguishing that case from this one. 
In Gowans. no suit was filed until the cancer had recurred. There was no 
occasion for our Supreme Court to rule on whether an earlier filed complaint 
alleging both present and future damages would have been actionable. It is 
noteworthy that in Gowans. the party contending for the earlier existence of a 
legally cognizable injury was not the patient, but the defending doctor. He did so 
in the context of a statute of limitations defense. Our Supreme Court merely held 
that he "failed to meet [his] burden to prove that Ms. Seale suffered a legally 
cognizable injury when she discovered that the cancer had spread to her lymph 
nodes." Our Court found that the doctor, not the patient, had "failed to argue or to 
produce evidence that in 1988, Ms. Seale could complain of any actual present 
damages." (923 P.2d at 1364-65). Our Supreme Court's conclusion in Gowans 
was merely this: 
Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing 
that Ms. Seale discovered any legally cognizable injury 
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in 1988 and was therefore barred by the statutory time 
period when she brought her action in 1991 when the 
cancer appeared in her hip. 
(Id. at 1365) (emphasis added). 
Our Supreme Court's "holding" in Seale v. Gowans is limited: "Damages in 
the form of an enhanced risk only are not sufficient to start the running of the 
statute of limitations." (Id.) Dr. Irion asks this Court to extend that holding and to 
assume our Supreme Court intended to rule that in no case could a patient 
herself pursue a claim where the only damage was heightened risk of cancer 
recurrence. Our Supreme Court has yet to make such a ruling. If it had, such a 
ruling would not justify dismissal of the Snows' claim because they claim very real 
and significant present damages resulting from Dr. Irion's negligence in addition 
to and wholly apart from Mrs. Snow's heightened risk of cancer recurrence. 
Dr. Irion's suggestion that his own understanding and interpretation of 
Seale v. Gowans is universal and any other interpretation would upset the 
justified expectation of past litigants is demonstrably unsound. He contends: 
"Plaintiffs' lawyers in this state have relied on Seale and made informed decisions 
not to initiate litigation in cases involving delayed cancer diagnosis until there has 
been a recurrence of cancer. . . " (Appellee brief at 8). Actually, any plaintiff's 
lawyer aware of present damages sustained as a result of a doctor's negligence 
pertaining to the diagnosis of cancer risks committing malpractice by not bringing 
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action immediately. The idea that combining such a claim with a claim for future 
loss is fatal to both claims did not gain notice (or notoriety) until this Court's 
decision in Medved v. Glenn. 
IV. 
CONTRARY TO DR. IRION'S SUGGESTION, UHCMA'S 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND STATUTE OF REPOSE 
ARE HIGHLY GERMANE TO THIS CONTROVERSY. 
In his footnote 6 (Appellee brief at 8), Dr. Irion states 
Neither the statute of limitations nor the statute of 
repose are issues in this case. Whether the statute of 
limitations or the statute of repose could or would 
preclude any of the Snows' claims is purely speculative. 
. . . These issues are unripe, were not decided by the 
trial court, and are not before this Court on appeal. 
(Appellee brief, p. 8, fn. 6). 
It is easy for Dr. Irion to discount concerns over the running of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations and statute or repose because 
those statutes can only benefit, not harm, him. Those statutes are of 
understandably major concern to litigants like the Snows. The Snows addressed 
both statutes in their memorandum to the district court (R. 50-51) and in their 
brief-in-chief to this Court. (Appellant brief pp. 14-18). Dr. Irion argues: "If this 
Court affirms the trial court's dismissal.. ., the Snows will retain the right to file a 
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claim for full recovery if Mrs. Snow suffers a future recurrence." This argument 
overlooks and trivializes the significant damage the Snows have already 
sustained and ignores the deprivation of access to the courts which occurs if Mrs. 
Snow does not suffer a future recurrence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Snows' complaint alleges Dr. Irion's surgical and post operative 
negligence caused them significant present, non speculative harms. Those 
harms include: perforation of Mrs. Snow's bladder; the seeding and spread of 
cancer cells throughout Mrs. Snow's peritoneal cavity; the incurrence of over 
$140,000 in medical bills for cancer surgery and chemotherapy which would not 
have been necessary but for Dr. Irion's negligence; loss of income, loss of job 
and consumption of employment benefits; impairment of earning capacity; loss of 
affordable insurance coverage; and quality of life damages. 
There was no need to have dismissed the significant portions of the Snows' 
claim seeking recovery for these harms merely because another portion of their 
claim (increased risk of cancer recurrence) was found to be inactionable. 
Our Supreme Court is in process of deciding whether Seale v. Gowans. 
supra, really does preclude a plaintiff from alleging, proving and recovering 
damages for a heightened risk of cancer recurrence. Until it has decided that 
-10-
question and has determined whether this Court's Medved decision needs 
modification, this Court should not affirm the district court's dismissal of the 
Snows' complaint. 
Respectfully submitted this / 3> day of May, 2005. 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARION SNOW and ROGER SNOW, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. IRION, M.D., 
Defendant. 
JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARION SNOW AND 
ROGER SNOW 
Civil No.: 040908601 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Roger and Marion Snow, being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
1. We had two post-operative appointments with Dr. Irion following Marion's 
hysterectomy surgery on June 18, 2002. Dr. Irion never personally informed either one 
of us at any time during those appointments that the tumor he removed from Marion during 
the June 18, 2002 surgery was cancerous. Dr. Irion made us an appointment with an 
oncologist, Dr. Christopher Jolles, who told us about the cancer. 
2. Although we understand there has been no diagnosis of "recurrent" cancer 
since Marion's second surgery on August 13, 2002, we have never been told by any 
physician that Marion is in remission or cured from her cancer. 
3. Because Marion was required to have two surgeries and chemotherapy 
treatment, she was required to use all of her family/home leave time from work and then 
lost her job and all related benefits, including health and life insurance coverage. She is 
no longer able to work. 
4. Marion applied for and was granted Social Security Disability benefits on 
November 7, 2003 because of health issues related to the spread of her ovarian tumor, 
requiring chemotherapy treatment and a second surgery. The benefits were deemed 
retroactive to December of 2002, shortly after Marion's second surgery. The monthly 
payments made by Social Security are substantially less than Marion's income when she 
was able to work. 
5. When Marion lost her job, we lost our group health insurance. We now have 
COBRA coverage, which is very costly, and which will expire in February 2005. At that 
point we will have no health insurance and Marion will still be too young for Medicare 
coverage. It is unlikely we will be able to obtain other health insurance due to her "pre-
existing" condition. 
6. We have incurred medical bills in excess of $140,000.00 which we believe 
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are directly attributable to Dr. Irion's substandard care. 
7. Marion is no longer able to perform many daily tasks she performed before 
Dr. Irion's surgery in June of 2002. We attribute her inability to perform many normal 
activities of daily living to Dr. Irion's substandard care. We believe that had Dr. Irion 
correctly diagnosed and removed Marion's ovarian tumor, there would have been no 
necessity for a second surgery to remove cancer resulting from seeding, and Marion would 
not have required the further treatment and surgery which have significantly reduced her 
ability to function. 
8. Since Dr. Irion's negligent removal of Marion's ovarian tumor, we have 
suffered a profound diminution of our quality of life together and cannot participate in many 
of the activities we used to enjoy before her injuries. 
DATED t h i s 2 § £ ^ y of June, 2004. 
•s.s*?^ r~< ^-rJZ^F?^:^ 
17 
DATED thia3CT day of, 
Roger S. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /% day of June, 2004. 
L ^ ^ l ^ t x t ^ - ^ 0 S> jUL*A<Jlsi^ 
Notary Public 
\\2kserver\common\My Files\Snow, MariorAAffidavit of Marion & Roger.06-29-04.wpd 
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HISTORY: This patient is a 61 year old white female who is being operated on by 
Dr. Irion for a hysterectomy. I was asked to see the patient during the surgery 
because of a perforation of the bladder. Dr. Irion and I discussed the case. 
The patient's bladder had been entered and we talked about closure of the 
bladder. Once this was accomplished, I came back and did a cystoscopy on the 
patient. The indigo was injected intravenously and could be seen to exude from 
the ureters bilaterally. 
PROCEDURE: 
DAVID A. KIMBALL, M.D. 
PAT: SNOW, MARION DIC: David A. Kimball, M.D. 
EVD: / / D: 07/07/2002 T: 07/08/2002 
C: 89425565 2435 3 - DMAQVS132H 
TYPIST: 438 JOB # 22233 BATCH: 26393 
